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Recent Cases
Co mmI ciAL LAW-PRIVnT OF CoNTRAcr NECESSARY FOR LML=
WARRANTY-PlIamtiff purchased an English Ford from an Alabama
retailer, drove it home and parked it. Later, when he turned on the
ignition, there was an explosion followed by a flash fire which burned
him severely The explosion was attributed to a crack in the gasoline
tank, which allowed the gasoline to leak into the closed car and
vaporize. The vapor was ignited by the spark generated when the
plaintiff turned on the ignition, thus causing the explosion and fire.
Plaintiff sued the English manufacturer and the American distributor
in federal district court, alleging, inter alia, that the defendants
mpliedly warranted that the automobile was fit and safe for the
purpose for wich it was manufactured. The complaint was dismissed
as to the English manufacturer for lack of jurisdiction. At the close
of the case, the defendant distributor was awarded a directed verdict.
Held: Reversed.' However, on the question of implied warranty, the
court stated that under Alabama law there can be no implied
warranty in the absence of privity of contract. Blitzstem v. Ford
Motor Co., 288 F.2d 738 (5th Cir. 1962).
The common law rule is that, in the absence of pnvity, a manu-
facturer of a defective article is liable neither in tort for negligence
nor n contract for breach of implied warranty 2 The common law
tort rule has been altered by MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.3 It is not
the purpose of this comment to go into recovery based upon negli-
gence; this comment discusses the requirement of pnvity of contract
in actions based upon implied warranty The exceptions to the
common law rule have generally been limited to purchases of foods,
drugs and beverages in their original containers.4
I The court reversed on the ground that a ]ury could reasonably have
found the defendant negligent in marketing a product which was inherently
dangerous and failing to inform the buyer that the article was dangerous.2 Karger v. Armour & Co., 17 F Supp. 484 (D.C. 1936); Annot., 111
A.L.R. 1285 (1937).
3217 N.Y. 382, Ill N.E. 1050 (1916). Where the nature of an article is
such that, if negligently made, it is reasonably certain to place life and limb in
peril, and the manufacturer has knowledge that it will be used without new tests
by persons other than the purchaser, then the manufacturer, irrespective of
pnvity of contract, must exercise care in the manufacture of the article.
4 Gottsdanker v. Cutter Laboratories, 182 Cal. App. 2d 602, 6 Cal. Rptr. 320
(1960); Cernes v. Pittsburgh Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 183 Kan. 758, 832 P.2d
258 (1958); Greenberg v. Lorenz, 12 Misc. 2d 883, 178 N.Y.S.2d 407 (Sup. Ct.
1958); Campbell Soup Co. v. Ryan, 328 S.W.2d 821 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959);
Amarillo Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Louder, 207 S.W.2d 632 (Tex. Civ. App.
1947). Annot., 79 A.L.R.2d 301, 332 (1960).
RECENT CASES
In 1815 courts began to recognize that a seller is at least under
some obligation to furnish merchantable goods even in the absence
of any express agreement as to quality 5 However, the majority of
American courts, prior to the enactment of the Uniform Sales Act,
held that no warranty can be implied where the seller is merely a
dealer.0 The trend today is to allow recovery by ultimate consumers
for injuries caused by defective products, without regard to pnvity
of contract.7 This trend began around 1930.8 Since 1985, no additional
states have rejected strict liability and ten more states have adopted
it.9 At least one court has recognized the trend, but has said that its
law is established and any change must be made by the legislature. 10
Kentucky adopted the Uniform Sales Act in 1928,11 and in 1960
11 Ky. Acts 1928, ch. 148, at 481, provided that there is no implied warranty
replaced it with the Uniform Commercial Code.12 However, since
neither the Act nor the Code expressly abolished the requirement of
pnvity, the Kentucky court was able to retain it and continue to
adhere to the common law rule.'3
With the development of modem methods of manufacture and
5 Gardiner v. Gray, 4 Campb. 144, 171 Eng. Rep. 46 (N.P. 1815). For
discussion, see 1 Williston, Sales §228 (rev. ed. 1948).
6 1 Williston, Sales 597 n.1 (rev. ed. 1948).
7B. F Goodrich v. Hammond, 269 F.2d 501 (10th Cir. 1959); Continental
Copper & Steel Indus. v. Cornelius, 104 So. 2d 40 (Fla. 1958); Spence v. Three
Rivers Builders & Masonry Supply, Inc., 353 Mich. 120, 90 N.W.2d 873 (1958);
Beck v. Spindler, 256 Minn. 543, 99 N.W.2d 670 (1959); Jarnot v. Ford Motor
Co., 191 Pa. Super. 422, 156 A.2d 569 (1959).
8 See Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel, 69 Yale L.J. 1099 (1960).
"'The assault upon the citadel of pnvity is proceeding in these days apace. So
said Cardozo in 1931, and has been much quoted since. With the passage of
nearly thirty years, a goodly part of the citadel still holds out; but the assault goes
on with unabated vigor. [One major bastion], that of the strict liability of
the seller of food and drink, is hard pressed and sore beset, and may even now
be tottenng to its fall." Prosser, supra at 1099.
9 Prosser, supra note 8, at 1110.
10 Lombardi v. California Packing Sales Co., 83 R.I. 51, 112 A.2d 701, 704
(1955).
or condition as to quality or fitness for any particular purpose of goods supplied
under a contract to sell or a sale, except that: (1) where the buyer relies on the
sellers skill or judgment, there is an implied warranty that the goods should be
reasonably fit for that purpose, and (2) goods which are bought by description
must be merchantable.12 Ky. Rev. Stat. §355.2-314 (1962) provides that "a warranty that goods
shall be merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale if the seller is a
merchant with respect to goods of that land." Ky. Rev. Stat. §355.2-315 (1962)
provides that if "the buyer is relying upon the seller s skill or judgment to select
or furnish suitable goods, there is unless excluded or modified an implied
warranty that the goods shall be fit for such purpose.
'aThe plaintiff, injured in the exposion of another s motorboat, brought
action against the owner and the seller of the boat. The Kentucky appellate
court, affirmng a directed verdict for the seller, held that where no contractual
relatiouship was shown between the seller and the plaintiff, the seller was not
liable for breach of implied warranty. Caplinger v. Werner, 311 S.W.2d 201
(Ky. 1958).
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distribution, the inappropriateness and injustice of the requirement
of privity have become apparent.14 A warranty is regarded as a
contract of personal indemnity with the original purchaser; it does not
run with the goods.15 Therefore, an implied warranty is made unavail-
able even to the buyer s family 16 A right of action based upon breach
of implied warranty rests upon the public policy of protecting
innocent buyers from harm. 17 The requirement of privity of contract
defeats this public policy and results in inequality and injustice both
to customers and mere users.'8 Those jurisdictions limiting or disavow-
ing the requirement of privity base their argument upon the moti-
vating force of public policy 19 Since this implied warranty does not
represent the express or implied-m-fact intent of the bargainers, but
is unposed by law as a vehicle of social policy, the courts should
extend it as far as the relevant social policy dictates.20 To insure
consumer protection, warranties that do run with the merchandise are
needed to protect all who are likely to be hurt by the defective
quality of such goods.21 If the requirement of privity is abolished,
the public will benefit in two ways: (1) Liability will revert back to
the manufacturer and cause him to exercise a higher degree of care in
manufacturing his product. (2) The injured party will be permitted
to recover under breach of implied warranty and will not have to
resort to the difficult task of proving negligence.
Under the Uniform Sales Act and the Uniform Commercial Code
it is possible to allow recovery based upon breach of implied warranty
in the absence of privity Although the Act restricts to a great extent
the use of implied warranty and implies that there should be no
14 Drury v. Armour & Co., 140 Ark. 871, 216 S.W 40 (1919); Burkhardt v.
Armour & Co., 115 Conn. 249, 161 At. 385 (1932); Smith v. Salem Coca-Cola
Bottling Co., 92 N.H. 97, 25 A.2d 125 (1942); Wood v. General Electric Co., 159
Ohio St. 273, 112 N.W.2d 8 (1953); Cngger v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 132
Tenn. 545, 179 S.W 155 (1915).
15 2 Harer & James, Torts §28.16 (1956).
16 Boruck v. MacKenzie Bros. Co., 125 Conn. 92, 3 A.2d 224 (1938);
Duncan v. Juman, 25 N.J. Super. 330, 96 A.2d 415 (1953).
17 Rogers v. Tom Home Permanent Co., 167 Ohio St. 244, 147 N.E.2d 612
(1958).
18Hermanson v. Hermanson, 19 Conn. Supp. 479, 117 A.2d 840 (1954);
Kennedy v. Brockelman Bros., Inc., 334 Mass. 225, 134 N.E.2d 747 (1956);
Kroger Grocery Co. v. Lewelling, 165 Miss. 71, 145 So. 726 (1933); Norton
Buick Co. v. E. W Tune Co., 351 P.2d 736 (Okla. 1960); Lombardi v. Cali-
forma Packing Sales Co., 83 R.I. 51, 112 A.2d 701 (1955); Brown v. Howard,
285 S.W.2d 752 (Tex. 1955); Williams v. S. H. Kress & Co., 48 Wash. 2d 88,
291 P.2d 662 (1955).
19 Lombardi v. Califorma Packing Sales Co., 83 R.I. 51, 112 A.2d 701
(1955); Griggs Canning Co. v. Josey, 139 Tex. 623, 164 S.W.2d 835 (1942).
20 See Jacob E. Decker & Son v. Capps, 139 Tex. 609, 164 S.W.2d 828
(1942).
21 See Justice Traynor s concurrng opinion in Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling
Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944).
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recovery by persons other than purchasers,'2 the New Jersey court
recently permitted the driver of an automobile to recover from the
seller even though there was no contractual relationship between
them.23 If the New Jersey court can find liability under the restrictive
wording of the Sales Act, then certainly the Kentucky court can find
liability under the less restrictive wording of the Commercial Code
and extend much-needed protection to ultimate consumers.
Wayne T Bunch
CoNsrtrrroNL LAw-Ex sIoNs oF hE BRowN CAs.-Negroes,
living m Mississippi, brought suit in a United States district court to
enjoin numerous defendants from enforcing Mississippi statutes which
required racial segregation of transportation facilities. The statutesi
applied to interstate and intrastate transportation. The plaintiffs con-
tended that the statutes deied them equal protection of the laws
guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment of the United States Con-
stitution. The district court judge, believing that a substantial con-
stitutional issue existed, convened a three-judge court.2 The three-
judge court decided to abstain from proceedings until the Mississippi
courts were given an opportunity to construe the statutes. A direct
appeal was made to the United States Supreme Court. Held: Vacated
and remanded. Since state statutes requiring racial segregation of
transportation facilities have been held unconstitutional it is error for
a federal district court to refuse to enjoin the enforcement of such
statutes; no substantial constitutional issue requisite for the conveumg
of a three-judge court exists. Bailey v. Patterson, 82 Sup. Ct. 549
(1962), vacating per curiam 199 F Supp. 595 (S.D. Miss. 1961).
Three cases3 were cited by the Court to support the proposition
that state statutes requiring racial segregation of interstate and intra-
state transportation facilities are unconstitutional. Two of these
cases, 4 however, involved interstate transportation and the statutes
were repudiated in both instances on the basis of the commerce clause
22 See note 11 supra for the pertinent provision of the Uniform Sales Act.
2 3 Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 NJ. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
1The statutes m question are: Miss. Code §§251, 2351.5, 2851.7, 7784,
7785, 7786, 7786-01, 7787.5 (1956). Breach of peace statutes complained of
but not affected by this decision are: Miss. Code §§2087.5, 2087.7, 2089.5 (Supp.
1960).
2 Ostensibly required by 28 U.S.C. §2281 (1958).
3 Boynton v. Virginia, 364 U.S. 454 (1960); Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S.
903 (1956); Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 873 (1946).
4 Boynton v. Virgima, supra note 8; Morgan v. Virginia, supra note 3.
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